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Le Secteur britannique de l’électricité face à la transition énergétique : la
responsabilité publique mise à l’épreuve 
Lucie de Carvalho
 
Introduction
1 In June 2019, the May government ramped up their efforts to set ambitious targets to
phase out fossil  fuel  energies from the domestic energy mix by amending the 2008
Climate Change Act. The amendment established a new legally-binding target of net
zero  greenhouse  gas  emissions  by  2050,  in  line  with  the  2016  Paris  Agreement.  As
things now stand (in mid-2020), UK greenhouse gas emissions have dropped by 43%
since 1990, meaning that the country is well underway to meet its 2022 target; yet,
projections beyond this first yardstick do not look as encouraging. As climate change
mitigation has become increasingly pressing, electricity efficiency and sustainability
have attracted intense political and academic interest since the energy sector stands at
the forefront of any transition to a low-carbon economy. Today more than ever, these
two  issues  have  become  symbiotically  interrelated,  as  “you  cannot  deal  with  climate
change without dealing with energy,  and you cannot deal with energy without dealing with
climate change”, as Lord Deben recently stated.1 
2 For the past 12 years, electricity and climate reforms have thus formed two sides of the
same coin. From the 2008 Climate Act to the 2012 Electricity Market Reform,2 the 2016
Paris Agreement and the more recent 2019 Net-Zero Roadmap,3 recent UK governments
have sought to reform the UK energy system to adapt it to the new demands of the
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ecological transition and to face the challenges of what is now known as ‘the energy
trilemma’,  namely affordability,  security  of  supply,  and sustainability.4 Affordability
relates to the electricity sector’s core function as a public good and a matter of public
interest,  since  electricity  services  are  critical,  not  only  to  sustain  economic  and
industrial activity, but also to guarantee a decent standard of living for all. 
3 Yet, tackling the energy trilemma does not only involve political decisions or leaps in
technological  innovations;  it  also requires  popular  trust  and political  leadership.  In
2017, a research paper on UK public attitudes towards the energy transition by Demski
et al concluded that public acceptance was not only affected by immediate pragmatic
concerns, such as affordable prices; it was affected by value-laden priorities, such as
equitable cost-sharing,  and  trust:  it  has  to  do  with  whom  respondents  deemed
responsible  for  making  the  necessary  changes  to  the  UK  energy  system.5 Public
acceptance is thus entrenched in the founding principle of accountability. 
4 Now,  although  accountability  is  one  of  the  most  frequent  concepts  used  in
administrative  literature,  it  is  also  one  of  the  most  difficult  to  define.6 Its  very
definition varies, and goes much beyond the most immediate meaning of accounting or
being responsible for a specific action or behaviour.7 A running thread in accountability
literature connects this concept to imperatives of integrity, responsibility, ethical and
professional  standards,  control  and popular oversight – all  of  them included in the
democratic concept of ‘good governance’.8 Accountability dynamics are visible through
performance  and  efficiency  scrutiny,  regulation,  and  transparent  reporting  to
determine  “who  does  what  and  why?”.9 In  short,  accountability  involves  five  key
components to uphold public interest: a) institutional frameworks and environment; b)
clearly allocated responsibilities and duties and clearly established mandates; c) clearly
defined expectations according to public interest imperatives; d) established scrutiny
procedures and capability leading to potential sanctions and penalties in case of failure;
and e) a solid degree of social participation in regulatory decisions.10
5 For public services, accountability underpins a system of checks and balances, which
plays out between four major poles of actors expected to act for the public interest:
public administration (government,  parliament,  the civil  service),  the courts of law,
vested industrial  interests,  and consumers.  At  a  crossroads between all  four stands
another key actor,  the regulator,  expected to  operate independently  from political,
industrial or financial interests,11 and, theoretically at least, be vested with a statutory
capacity to demand answers and enforce sanctions.12 
6 Given  the  many  challenges  the  energy  transition  and  climate  change  mitigation
policies have raised about accountability in the UK electricity sector, this article offers
to explore how new public management restructuring has impacted the regulator’s and
the executive’s mandate, authority, and capacity to address new climate imperatives
while upholding taxpayers’ interests. The aim will be to assess whether accountability
dynamics have acted as a facilitating or a hampering variable on the country’s path to
decarbonisation and whether accountability mechanisms have proven efficient enough
to scrutinise both the government and the regulator. Since regulation can be either
pre-emptive or reactive, I shall look into two separate regulation stages, on the one
hand, policy formulation and on the other, policy implementation.
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The Impact of Privatisation on Accountability in the
UK Electricity Sector
Towards the network accountability paradigm
7 The  UK  electricity  sector  underwent  major  structural  and  regulatory  upheavals
through the 1989 Electricity Act as part of the third step in Thatcher’s privatisation
campaign. Market liberalisation, often dubbed deregulation, was completed when an
independent  regulatory  authority  was  established,  Offer  (the  Office  of  Electricity
Regulation).  The  mandate  of  the  regulator  was  three-fold:  first,  it  was  expected  to
regulate the enduring monopolistic network companies to guarantee ‘good value for
money’  through  cost-efficiency  and  good  customer  services;  second,  to  monitor
competition for generation and supply markets to mitigate oligopolistic activities and
market failures in the newly-privatised electricity market; “finally, the regulatory body
was  to  guarantee  supply  security  and  sustainability  for  present  and  future  generations  of
consumers”.13 In  short,  the  regulator  was  entrusted  with  fiduciary  duties,  alongside
Parliament and the government, while service-delivery functions were removed “from
public administration and [contracted] out to firms operating in the private sector”.14 
8 Often held up as a textbook example of a successful case study, the UK has regularly
been  praised  as  “the  poster  child  of  energy  market  liberalisation,”15 for  its  pioneering
approach to electricity regulation by economists and energy experts alike. The early
success of privatisation has mostly been ascribed to Offer’s initial strategy to embrace
‘incentive  regulation’.  By  leaving  private  utilities  flexibility  to  improve  service
efficiency, this strategy was the epitome of the ‘light-handed approach to electricity
regulation’ embraced by Offer and promoted by its first director (1989-1998), renowned
British economist Stephen Littlechild. The regulator would rather set price caps for
generation than go for more rigid rate-of-return regulation. According to Littlechild,
the regulator’s prime focus should be to abide by the motto “competition where possible,
regulation where not”.16 Offer therefore took a backseat in regulation, only interfering
when concerns over market dominance for electricity generation erupted, as was the
case  in  1994  when  Offer  compelled  two  generating  utilities,  National  Power  and
Powergen, to sell off 6,000 MW capacity to avoid market duopoly. Overall, price caps
were thus key mechanisms for Offer to protect the interests of consumers, given that
privatisation  did  not  fully  achieve  its  original  purpose,  namely  to  break  down
monopolies and foster natural competition between companies to lower prices.17 How
have 1990s’ reforms affected accountability?
9 Privatising and liberalising the UK energy sector featured as a prime example of key
principles of New Public Management (NPM) gaining ground in UK politics. The impact
of  NPM theories  on the electricity  sector were first  the introduction of  managerial
imperatives into public services provision, now geared towards the rationalisation of
public  action  through  budget-keeping,  target-setting  and  short-term  strategic
planning. Besides, the new constellation of public-private energy actors was meant to
foster  more  transparency,  plural  accountability  and  participatory  involvement  in
proceedings  and  decision  making  by  establishing  new  sources  of  accountability.18
Dalingwater described deregulation as “disaggregation, which refers to the strengthening of
central strategic capacity by decoupling policy and executive functions; tighter central control
over policy and frameworks and a move from concentrating on process to output in control and
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accountability mechanisms.”19 A key part of this dynamic, the electricity regulator, was
established  as  an  arm’s  length  body,  theoretically  independent  from  executive  or
ministerial  oversight  to  inject  more  transparency  and  impartiality  into  the  energy
sector and thus foster confidence from both the public and sectorial  interests.  This
structural reform came to be known as the ‘accountability-network paradigm’.20 
 
The limits of accountability-network reforms: grey zones and
accountability loopholes
10 Despite  its  first  successful  results,  the  UK  experimental  regulatory  regime  soon
attracted  academic  criticism.21 Although  the  regulator’s  mandate  was  rather  clear
theoretically  speaking,  its  action  capacity  has  remained  limited  in  practice,  as  its
powers  have  been  limited  to  prosecutorial  and  adjudicatory  powers  without  being
granted rule-making prerogatives, still vested in government. Furthermore, as for most
arm’s length bodies, Offer’s directors-general have been appointed by the Secretary of
State for the Department of Trade and Industry – a recruitment process that has been
the target of much criticism not only for the lack of public oversight,22 but also because
it  has  turned  out  that  regulation  directions  have  been  quite  subservient  to  the
approach and the personality of the director-general, as demonstrated by Littlechild’s
influence  over  Offer’s  original  trajectory.  Finally,  regulatory  oversight  remained
isolated at the national level,  limiting its accountability to local authorities.  In that
sense, the British regulatory approach differed greatly from the US regime, in which
regulatory  authority  was  broken  down  and  distributed  between  several  regional
regulatory commissions.23 In other words, decentralisation of service delivery was not
accompanied by decentralisation of decision making or even revenue allocation. 
11 Moreover, NPM reforms have not provided a clear answer to who is accountable for
what and how. By separating executive and regulatory remits,  the establishment of
independent  quangos  like  Offer  created  an  institutional  in-betweenness  for
accountability.  If  they  became  more  independent  from  ministerial  encroachment,
quangos also eroded Ministers’ leverage to make their frontline services accountable,
offsetting all the unquestionable democratic virtues of independent regulation.24 Moyes
also adds that: 25
This fracturing of responsibility and accountability would see Ministers remaining
accountable to Parliament without having control or even, necessarily, the basis to
intervene,  and  commissioners,  providers  or  regulators  potentially  exercising
control without being accountable to Parliament.
12 Furthermore,  the  complexity  of  current  policy  matters  has  also  inflated  the
departmental silo effect, whereby responsibilities over certain policy areas cut across
several  departmental  boundaries,  thereby  creating  a  dispersion  of  accountability.
Although  Ofgem  is  sponsored  by  the  department  in  charge  of  energy  matters,
electricity regulation for instance is not only the remit of the present Department of
Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy; it can also be connected, among other things,
to environmental matters, land planning, health, or devolved questions. 
13 Finally,  an  extensive  literature  on  the  matter  has  raised  the  alarm  about  the
introduction  of  private  actors  defending  separate  vested  interests  that  do  not
necessarily  align  with  the  public  interest  due  to  inherently  diverging  ambitions.
Although, as Farnetti noted, “[a] public-sector company is not necessarily a not-for-profit
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company, and a private-sector company is not necessarily a for-profit company,”26 it is safe to
say that private actors, such as electricity generation or supply utilities, remain driven
by value creation and marketability. They are first and foremost accountable to their
shareholders before their contractors,  while essential  public services like electricity
provision are geared towards good value for money, but also the defense of the public
interest. 
14 As  called  out  in  a  2014  report  from  the  Public  Administration  Committee,  the
institutional  system thus remains “full  of  anachronisms and anomalies”27 and tensions
abound regarding the actual precinct and responsibilities of each authority. Instead of
improving accountability, these reforms further inflated the chameleonic nature of the
concept due to the fact that much is still left to each actor’s interpretation and shaped
by the country’s regulatory and policy culture.28 Consequently, to assess accountability
in electricity regulation since 2010, we need to look at specific episodes when good
governance debates over climate change mitigation have surfaced, starting with the
first stage of regulation: policy design. 
 
Policy Design: the Impact of the Sustainability Agenda
on Policy Directions and Decision-Makers’ Mandates
15 By the early 2010s, the pace of target-setting quickened as a flurry of new roadmaps
and carbon reduction targets  bridged Labour and the Coalition’s  tenures.  This  new
climate change agenda impacted the relations between the government, the electricity
utilities, Parliament and the regulator, by introducing a new goal in domestic policy,
that of striving to roll in sustainability on top of vetting efficiency and price mitigation.
Given  that  27%  of  greenhouse  emissions  are  produced  by  the  energy  sector,
responsibility to shift primary electricity generation from fossil fuels to green energy
sources, renewables and nuclear power, has befallen both markets and government. 
16 The energy transition thus stood as a major accountability test for the government
since  failure  to  meet  such statutory  objectives  would  then be  ascribed not  only  to
industry  and  market  participants  but  also  to  the  government.  In  the  context  of
liberalised markets, the primary role of the government as a policy designer was thus
to set clear directions and make sure that transparency and confidence were firmly
established, to guarantee that industry utilities would take on the risks of changing
their operating practices. 
17 Government policy  came in the form of  the 2012 Electricity  Market  Reform, which
aimed at overhauling the rules of the market game to meet the energy trilemma. The
reform spelt out stronger state intervention in the electricity market through the use
of  specific  market  mechanisms  to  steer  electricity utilities  towards  low-carbon
production and boost private investments in renewables by the late 2020s. In order to
compensate utilities for potential labour and effective costs of sustainability incurred
by staff  training,  potential  job losses,  technical  improvements  and overall  need for
investments to shore up domestic wind and nuclear energy capacity, the 2013 Reform
entrenched the use of two specific subsidy schemes, the Contract-for-Difference (CfD)
and Feed-in-Tariffs (FiT). 
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Scrutinising government electricity policy through judicial oversight
18 As constantly underlined in accountability literature, the ability to use administrative
action  to  protect  basic  liberties,  including  property  rights,  against  governmental
encroachment is fundamental to all healthy democracies, as restated by the European
Convention of Human Rights. Consequently, judicial bodies fulfil their accountability
function  when  addressing  whether  or  not  a  government  measure  meets  its public
purpose. 
19 In October 2011 the then UK energy Minister, Greg Barker, announced that cuts to the
FiTs for small-scale solar projects would be introduced on 12 December 2011. Yet the
FiT rates were only to be reviewed 6 months later, in March 2012. Such a decision thus
challenged one principle underpinning the original subsidy scheme, stating that “no
retrospective change for low carbon investments” could be applied.29 This so-called grand-
fathering principle guaranteed that no future government could alter the established
legislation, to ensure long-term investor confidence in government policy and support.
As a response to this sudden U-turn in government strategy that led to the cancellation
of nearly 15,000 planned solar installations, 14 solar industry companies filed a claim
against the Department of Energy and Climate Change (DECC) before the British High
Court and then defended their case before the Court of Appeal. 
20 The claim was run by energy specialist law firm Prospect Law which sought damages on
the grounds that the government’s premature decision had incurred major prospective
losses in earnings for these companies. As illustrated by the Ernst & Young Renewable
Energy Attractiveness Index, the government’s change of heart regarding subsidies to
the solar sector had indeed visibly dented consumer and investor confidence in solar
power.30 Rebuke came from the courts: both the High Court and the Court of Appeal, in
December 2011 and January 2012 respectively, ruled against DECC,31 arguing that the
government’s move was “illegal and unfair,”32 and that DECC was operating “outside its
code of practice”. Solar companies won £132 million damages as compensation. The legal
ruling  confirmed  that  the  government’s  move  had  stifled  the  performance  of  the
budding  solar  sector  and  its  retroactive  character  had  greatly  hampered  investor
confidence. 
21 The  UK  Supreme  Court  then  rejected  DECC’s  permission  to  appeal  in  May  2012.
Consequently,  DECC’s  decision was overruled and solar installations set  up between
December  2011  and  March  2012  obtained  a  25-year  guaranteed  FiT,  as  originally
planned.  Undeterred  by  this  first  failure,  the  Government  attempted  to  introduce
another cut in FiTs in August 2012,  leading to a new instalment in the legal  battle
between the government and solar industry companies, resulting in the 2015 DECC v.
Breyer Group PLC and Others case ruled by the Supreme Court of Judicature.33 In this court
ruling, UK judges gave a slightly different assessment of DECC’s 2011 decision, arguing
that the fundamental fault lay in the fact that DECC’s measure went against the 1998
Human Rights Act upholding the right to goodwill. In this case, ‘marketable goodwill’ is
to  be  understood  as  a  ‘possession’  thus  protected  by  the  right  to  property.34 By
providing  retrospective  changes  to  the  economic  foundation  of  solar  energy
investment, DECC thus acted ultra vires, interfered with “this possession” and violated the
ECHR. 
22 In  short,  these  various  judicial  cases  presented  before  Britain’s  most  senior  judges
contributed  to  avoiding  setting  a  most  dangerous  precedent  by  preventing  the
Delivering the UK Energy Transition with an Accountable and Competitive Elect...
Revue Française de Civilisation Britannique, XXVI-2 | 2021
6
government from unilaterally altering incentive mechanisms, even more so as those
mechanisms were still deemed crucial to ensure the industry’s survival. At that stage,
all indicators revealed that the private sector was indeed unable to shoulder the cost of
expanding the solar industry alone. A 2013 DECC report on Renewable Roadmap would
later confirm that roughly £100 to 110 billion needed to be injected into the electricity
sector by 2020 to meet the 15% renewables target.35 These court rulings also testified to
the  efficiency  of  judicial  oversight,  by  holding  the  government  to  account.  They
demonstrated that  government action encroached on property  rights,  and that  the
public-interest  or  value-for-taxpayers’-money  rational  was  void.  Eventually,  the
government’s unilateral decision to pick the winners and only sponsor offshore wind
and nuclear power came through the UK’s project in 2016 to build new nuclear power
plants, as the subsidy scheme came to its natural end and was not renewed in 2018.36
23 In short, the Supreme Court and the lower Courts have upheld the founding principles
of  ministerial  and executive accountability.  Just  like  any parliamentary proceeding,
energy decisions are judiciable and bound not only by convention or practices, but also
by constitutional law. These cases provide further evidence that the UK senior courts
are  morphing  into  constitutional  courts  whose  primary  mandate  is  to  defend
democratic oversight and accountability. As Hogarth contends, these two cases can be
seen as crowning precedents indicating that the courts, including the Supreme Court,
had become: 37
a  guardian of  democracy  in  the  UK,  policing  the  boundaries  of  constitutionally
proper  behaviour.  Any  ministers  tempted  to  defy  constitutional  norms  or
conventions should beware: The Supreme Court has put them on notice. 
24 Yet,  such  a  reassertion  of  ministerial  and  executive  accountability  to  the  courts
remains inherently bound by either subsequent judicial decisions and the executive’s
alternative means of  policymaking that may still  incapacitate,  override or limit  the
scope of judicial scrutiny. 
 
Scrutinising government electricity policy through parliamentary
oversight
25 The  government’s  energy  policy  strategy  and  incentive  mechanisms  have  not  only
come within the scrutiny radar of the Courts but also that of Parliament.  Although
scrutinising  the  government’s  energy  policy  is  complexified  by  the  silo  effect,
parliamentary oversight has primarily been the responsibility of two separate bodies:
the  Commons’  Energy  and  Climate  Change  Select  Committee  (ECC)  and  a  separate
advisory quango, the Committee on Climate Change. 
26 The Commons’ ECC select committee was established through the 2008 Climate Change
Act  to  scrutinise  DECC.  In  its  2015  Progress  Report  to  Parliament,  the  ECC  select
committee investigated the government’s  generation policy,  and their  controversial
decision to scrap the subsidy incentives to onshore wind, in an approach quite similar
to the solar affair. In this inquiry, the ECC select committee interviewed Lord Deben,
director-general  of  the  Committee  on  Climate  Change,  who  challenged  the
government’s management of public money, arguing that scrapping support to onshore
wind would cost roughly £1 billion to consumers every year.38 
27 In  2015  the  ECC  Select  Committee  also  issued  their  Priorities  for  the  2015-2020
parliamentary session based on a public consultation that had received evidence from
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249 industry, academic and public contributors.39 This new roadmap revealed that the
Committee intended to further investigate the government’s energy strategy in terms
of consistency and transparency over subsidy schemes. In 2016, the Committee also
issued  a  scathing  report  on  Investor  Confidence  in  the  UK  Energy  Sector,  here  also
challenging the Cameron government for their handling of energy subsidy schemes,
deeming  them  to  have  seriously  harmed  investor  confidence  and  the  UK’s
attractiveness. The government’s sudden changes of heart had “raised serious questions
about the government’s plans for meeting long-term carbon objectives”.40
28 Yet,  the  investigative  capability  of  this  parliamentary  select  committee  came to  be
restricted by executive reshuffling decisions. Its 2015 inquiry was interrupted by the
2016  referendum,  and  Theresa  May’s  election  to  the  party  leadership  led  to  the
dismantling of DECC, as energy and climate change matters migrated to another newly-
established department, the Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy Department. The
new parliamentary BEIS committee, which began operating on 10 October 2016, has so
far  proven less  keen to investigate energy regulation matters;  the lines  of  scrutiny
identified by their predecessors in their 2015 roadmap have been shelved and only one
inquiry has been run so far on the government’s Net-Zero policy since 2016. 
29 Parallel  to  the  now  defunct  ECC  Select Committee,  another  statutory  body,  the
Committee on Climate Change (CCC), has also been involved in scrutinising government
policy since its  inception in 2008 –  even more since the ECC select  committee was
disbanded in 2016. Its original mandate was two-fold: first, to advise government on
emission  targets;  and  second,  to  report  to  parliamentary  select  committees  on  the
progress  made,  thus  acting  as  a  bridge  between  the  executive  and  the  legislative
powers. In the summer 2019, the CCC published two very critical reports, questioning
the government’s approach to meet the Net-Zero targets. In its second report, Reducing
UK Emissions 2019 Progress Report to Parliament, the CCC renewed the central premise that
“the government of the day holds the responsibility to act to protect future generations”, as
established through the 2008 Climate Change legislation.41 The report also revealed that
the Committee found “a substantial gap between current plans and future requirements and
an even greater shortfall in action.”42 This report thus called the government out on their
inconsistent  approach  of  establishing  a  Net-Zero  target  while  at  the  same  time
disbanding DECC and downgrading climate change as a secondary policy priority. Yet,
just  like that of  the Select  Committee,  the CCC’s  work has remained fundamentally
advisory  in  nature,  generating  little  reaction  from  the  government.  Consequently,
parliamentary  accountability  seems  restricted  to  a  conventional  process  that  is
pursued with more or less interest by the MPs involved with little sanction capacity,
potentially reducing MPs to barking dogs without biting power. Overall, parliamentary
oversight of executive and ministerial decisions thus remains a transparency device
that has restricted Parliament’s capacity to check the government’s progress and policy
decisions. 
30 Overall, the government’s decision-making mandate has been scrutinised by “multiple
accountabilities”, be they judicial (the Courts), political (Parliament’s select committee),
or  advisory  (the  CCC).  The  examples  presented  tend  to  suggest  that  government
accountability to these bodies remains fundamentally elusive, diluted in a “tangled web”
of accountability.43 Partisan bias could be a likely parameter determining Parliament’s
degree of involvement in questioning the government’s steps to meet the demands of
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the energy trilemma, to quicken the pace of the energy transition, through affordable
prices, and long-term sustainability. 
31 Since 2010, the UK government has thus sent very contradictory signals and the judicial
and  parliamentary  responses  to  their  policy  have  nonetheless  dented  political
credibility and predictability, in turn undermining market and investor confidence. As
Heller and McCubbins underlined: 44
incentives for investing in infrastructure industries are not credible within a given
regulatory structure unless there is a political context that makes them sustainable.
Regulatory  predictability  is  a  key  feature  for  gaining credibility,  and hence the
important role of political institutions in enhancing this predictability. 
32 Let us now turn to a second regulatory stage, policy implementation to examine the
electricity regulator’s accountability.
 
Policy Implementation: the Effectiveness of Ofgem as
a Regulatory Watchdog
Ofgem’s waning ability to protect consumer interest 
33 At the  other  end of  the  policy  spectrum,  electricity  reforms will  most  likely  affect
consumers  through  price  variations.  Recent  literature  on  decarbonisation  has
demonstrated that transition to a low-carbon economy, whatever the pathway chosen,
will be costly.45 Ever since the early 1970s, energy prices and affordability have been a
continual  public  and political  concern.  A 2014 YouGov survey revealed that  energy
prices  were  the  third  top political  concern  of  40% of  the  respondents,  behind  the
economy  (59%)  and  immigration  (49%).46 According  to  a  study  run  on  public
perceptions  about  accountability  for  energy prices,  Demski  et  al. showed that  most
respondents believed that energy utilities, despite being bound by their public service
mandate,  were  not  trustworthy  and  not  “contributing  their  share  to  fund  the  energy
transition.”47 As previously stated, private companies have little to no interest to lower
their prices, as it narrows their profit margins. That is one of the reasons why the UK’s
approach to electricity regulation has been geared towards price regulation, under the
responsibility of the regulator, Ofgem (which replaced Offer in 2000).
34 Since  the  rise  of  climate  change  concerns  and  the  introduction  of  climate  change
legislation in the late 2000s, Ofgem has faced mounting criticism over its independence
and autonomy from executive control,  thus challenging its  mandate as  guardian of
consumer interest against political and sectoral interest:48 
35 Firstly, in an analysis of Ofgem’s Decarbonisation Action Plan published in February 2020,
John Constable argued that Ofgem had demonstrated very little  interest  in actually
running independent  cost  analyses,  as  the  report  only  relied on government’s  cost
assessment.49 Similarly, Constable contends that the same report “argues that costs of
wind generation will fall in the long term without referring to debates in academic circles about
it, nor does it question the success of the CfD contracts.” And yet why would they, especially
considering  the  present  CEO’s  background:  before  being  appointed  Ofgem  CEO  in
October 2019, Jonathan Brearley was part of Tony Blair’s Prime Minister Strategy Unit;
between 2006 and 2009, he headed the Office of Climate Change, which contributed to
drafting the 2008 Climate Change bill, and from 2009 to 2013, he was Director of Energy
Markets and Infrastructure Networks, operating within DECC. Brearley actually was a
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key architect of the Energy Market Reform and a major proponent of the very same CfD
systems in 2012, which Ofgem has been expected to scrutinise. 50 In other words,  his
previous  involvement  in  climate-change  policy  making  could  constitute  a  potential
conflict of interest and compromises his impartiality and independence. 
36 Finally, the 2010-2012 reforms have actually infringed on Ofgem’s capacity to guarantee
electricity affordability in the defence of consumer interests. The 2010 Electricity Act
indeed amended the very definition of ‘consumer interest’,  which no longer merely
covers “the interests of existing and future consumers” in a competitive environment, as
defined in the 2000 Utilities Act, but also now states that those interests are subservient
to  the  need  to  reduce  greenhouse  gas  emissions  and  guarantee  supply  security.  It
follows  that  the  2010  Act  in  effect  defanged  Ofgem,  preventing  it  from  effectively
challenging the government, even if it would later befall on consumers to foot the bill
through price or cost hikes. Similarly, average electricity prices paid by UK households
have been rising constantly since 2000, soaring by 67% since 2000, and by 20% since
2007.51 Ofgem has thus shown little capacity to either rein in the six major electricity
utilities, or incentivise them to lower their prices while curbing their greenhouse gas
emissions.52 Evidence thus tends to suggest that decarbonisation has greatly eroded
Ofgem’s capacity to bring either the government or the utilities to account, and the
other  way  round:53 consumer  interests  have  be  sacrificed  to  the  demands  of  the
government’s  green  agenda.  In  line  with  the  original  light-regulation  approach
embraced  in  the  early  1990s,  Ofgem  has  implicitly  embraced  the  Machiavellian
imperative that, in the context of decarbonisation, the end justifies the means.
 
When heads must roll: accountability for electricity blackouts
37 A  final  avenue  to  test  sectoral  accountability  in  policy  implementation  would  be
operational  failure.  In  the  electricity  sector,  blackouts  are  a  good  example,  as
accountability involves identifying where the responsibility lies to make sure ‘lessons
have  been  learned’.  Due  to  their  spectacular  consequences,  blackouts  often  attract
intense media attention, as was the case in May 2008,54 December 201355 and August
2019 when a  gas  power station and a  windfarm unexpectedly  went  into shutdown,
leading  to  severe  disruption  in  public  transport  and  leaving  over  one  million
households in England and Wales without electricity for up to 9 hours. 
38 In  these  instances,  scrutiny  immediately  fell  on  both  the  National  Grid  and  the
regulator. The subsequent inquiries and investigations into the 2019 outage, the biggest
in the decade, failed to provide a clear view of the situation as each actor engaged in a
blame-game to avoid shouldering the cost of compensating customers.56 The focus of
attention was directed at the National Grid’s responsibility and the inherent conflict of
interest  rising  from  the  fact  that  the  National  Grid  owns  and  operates  energy
transmission infrastructures in the UK and interconnectors with the Continent, while
also  being  in  charge  of  balancing  electricity  supply  and  demand.  For  the  Labour
Opposition, this instance furthered their renationalisation agenda as calls to counter
privatisation have gained momentum within Labour ranks,  especially  under Jeremy
Corbyn’s leadership.
39 In other words, the 2019 power blackout reignited debates over structure, ownership
and  role  assignment.  Yet  investigations  failed  really  to  investigate  further  the
technological  capability  or resilience,  let  alone  sustainability,  of  the  UK  electricity
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network. By directing all political and media attention onto one specific stakeholder in
a fundamentally interconnected system, the government somehow deflected attention
away from the question of government investment in technological innovation. 
40 All in all, accountability at the delivery stage seems more geared towards immediate
blame and sanction,  rather than learning lessons;  while media attention was short-
term, little political reaction actually emerged in the wake of the outage – Parliament’s
BEIS Select Committee did not launch any inquiry and the matter seems today to have
been overshadowed by other more pressing issues. Yet, this recent blackout episode
brings to light the political nature of accountability which “overemphasises the role of
blame in holding individuals and organisations to account. This, ironically, undermines the focus
on improvement that the public wants to see following failures.”57 
 
Conclusion
41 This article has aimed to identify the impacts of  NPM reforms on accountability in
electricity services in the light of the present decarbonisation agenda. Rather difficult
to fully delineate in practice, accountability remains both an ideal and a democratic
imperative embedded in rules, practices, frameworks, but also in culture. NPM reforms
were primarily justified as a means to solve “the problems of remoteness, unresponsiveness,
and  unaccountability  associated  with  twentieth-century  nationalised  industries”.58 Yet  the
present case study suggests that they have not fully met their original purposes. 
42 NPM  reforms  have  not  fundamentally  deconstructed  the  existing  regulatory  and
accountability culture in Britain. The previous vertical, executive-centred, command-
and-control decision-making pattern has endured; unremitting executive interference
has made economic and political interest hard to reconcile with sustainability, while
the other institutional or statutory sources of accountability have shown little leverage
to  influence  governmental  policies.  On  the  one  hand,  although  parliamentary  and
judicial oversight has proven rather efficient in calling the government out on their
policy  inconsistencies  and  their  lack  of  staunch  support  for  the  renewable  energy
industry,  their  scope  remains  limited  due  to  inbuilt  time  limitations,  be  they
parliament’s  lifespans  or  procedural  restrictions,  and their  enduring ad  hoc nature.
Nevertheless,  evidence  tends  to  suggest  that  Britain’s  parliamentary  democracy  is
growing  increasingly  legalistic.59 On  the  other  hand,  due  to  an  enduring  lack  of
independence, the regulator’s leverage has progressively been eroded along with its
capabilities to monitor and bring either private service providers or the government to
account.  Recent  policy  changes  tend to  suggest  that  climate  change mitigation has
pushed the key component of affordability onto the backburner, sapping Ofgem’s drive
to act in the consumers’ interest. 
43 Although  service  reliability  and  performance  have  improved  since  privatisation,
electricity prices continue to follow an upward trend,60 and the issue of fuel poverty has
been gaining increasing academic and media attention. Given that affordability, energy
prices  and the question of  ownership are fundamentally  ideologically  driven,  being
tightly  intertwined with  issues  of  equity,  public  interest and social  justice,  climate
change mitigation has not depoliticised accountability in energy questions – quite the
opposite. 
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ABSTRACTS
This article discusses accountability in UK electricity services against the backdrop of the energy
transition. Today’s decarbonisation imperatives stand as a major accountability test for the UK
government and the electricity regulator, which have been grappling with the energy trilemma
since the early 2000s. The analysis will determine the extent to which both have responded to
these  new goals  while  still  abiding  by  their  original  mandate  to  uphold  the  public  interest.
Climate change imperatives have actually brought to the surface enduring faulty accountability
dynamics,  which  had  at  first  been  obscured  –  by  practice  or  design  –  by  the  new  public
management reforms of the early 1990s. The inherently ad hoc and flexible British accountability
culture  therefore  appears to  have  contributed  to  hampering  the  country’s  progress  towards
decarbonisation. 
Cet  article  propose  d’étudier  la  responsabilité  publique  (accountability)  dans  le  secteur
britannique  de  l’électricité,  à  la  lumière  de  la  transition  énergétique.  Les  enjeux  liés  aux
obligations  de  décarbonisation  du  système  économique  ont  mis  à  l’épreuve  la  capacité  du
gouvernement  britannique  et  de  l’autorité  de  régulation  de  l’énergie  à  répondre  à  ce  qu’on
appelle communément le trilemme énergétique. Il s’agira d’analyser la façon dont ces nouveaux
impératifs ont eu un impact sur leurs capacités à remplir leur mission publique de défense de
l’intérêt  général.  Cette  analyse  démontre  que  les  enjeux  climatiques  ont  révélé  des
dysfonctionnements  profonds  en  termes  de  responsabilité  publique,  que  les  réformes
néolibérales des années 1980 avaient, volontairement ou involontairement, participés à occulter.
La  nature  même  de  la  culture  britannique  en  matière  de  responsabilité  publique,
traditionnellement caractérisée par le  pragmatisme et  la flexibilité,  apparaît  ainsi  comme un
frein majeur à une mise en œuvre efficace de la transition énergétique. 
INDEX
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